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[L . .A. No. 22855. In Bank. Jan. 12, 1954.] 
LAURA CUCINELLA et al., Appellants, v. WESTON 
BISCUIT COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Re-
spondents. 
[11 Automobiles-Evidence~Speed.-In action for injuries sus-
tained by ped€strian who was struck by automobile while 
attempting to cross a highway at a place other than an inter-
section and not in a crosswalk, marked or unmarked, evidence 
of average speed usually traveled by motorists on such high-
way was admissible as part of res gestae on issue of plaintiff's 
contributory negligence there being other evidence that 
plaintiff as well as defendant was familiar with area in which 
accident occurred and that plaintiff was injured when she at-
tempted to return to curb without loolring for traffic which 
might be approaching. 
[2] Appeal..:..... Right to Allege Error-Estoppel . ..:..... Plaintiff is not in 
a position to complain on appeal that she was not permitted 
to prove that she and others customarily crossed street at 
point of accid€nt, that formerly a crosswalk had been marked 
there, and that a marked crosswalk had been authorized at 
that point, where an opportunity was provided her to prove 
that a marked crosswalk formerly existed and her counsel 
did not take advantage of such opportunity. 
[3] Automobiles- Contributory Negligence- Persons Crossing 
Streets.-Unless an authorized marked crosswalk is actually 
marked, the fact that it has been authorized cannot affect 
duties of persons using streets. 
[ 4] Id.-Instrnctions-Amount and Degree of Caution Required.-
In action for 1njuries sustained by pedestrian who. was struck 
by automobile while attempting to cross roadway, plaintiff's .re-
questea, instru(ltions that amount of caution required of driver 
and p.edeji>trian may not be the same for eac]I, will. vary in 
accordance. with nature of act and. surrounding eircumstanel)s, 
and increases as (loes danger that I'easo11ably should be appre-
hended, .correctly stated the law; .but refusal to give them 
did not constitute prejudicial error, where court at defendants' 
request . instruflted .. that it is the duty. of every person using 
a public highway, whether a pedestrian or the driver of any 
kind of vehicle, to use ordinary care to .avoid placing himself 
or others in danger and to avoid a collision, that such duty 
(1) See Cal.Jur.id, .Automobiles, § 383 et seq.; . Am.Jur •.•. .Auto~ 
mobiles, §63Q. 
MeK.. Dig. ~eferences: [1] .Automobiles., ~ 211; [2] .Appeal 
and, Error, § 1088; [3] .Automobiles, § 129{1); .[4] 1\utomqbiles, 
§§ 318, 343, 385-1. 
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continues even when one has the right of way, and that law 
a highway at a place other than 
an intersection. and not in a crosswalk marked or unmarked, 
to of way to all vehicles on roadway so near as 
to constitute an immediate hazard and amount of caution re-
care increases as does danger 
person in like position would ap-
where instruction on imminent peril was 
to jury, and where jury was instructed fairly as 
uno<cucur; of ordinary care and that if "any rule, direction 
or idea" been stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon 
was intended and that jury was to consider all instructions 
as a whole. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Wilbur C. Curtis, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for injuries sustained by pedestrian in 
an automobile accident. Judgment for defendants affirmed. 
William W. Waters and Henry F. Walker for Appellants. 
Hunter & Liljestrom and Harold J. Hunter for Re-
spondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiffs, who are husband and wife, 
appeal from an adverse judgment entered upon a jury verdict 
in their action to recover damages resulting when plaintiff 
wife was struck an automobile while she was attempting 
to walk across San :F'ernando Road in the city of Los Angeles. 
We have concluded that no prejudicial error or miscarriage 
of justice is shown and that the judgment should be affirmed. 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%.) 
'fhe accident occurred about 9 :30 in the morning of April 
25, 1950. 'l'he weather was clear and dry and visibility was 
good. Plaintiff1 had walked in an easterly direction halfway 
across San Pernando Road, a north-south highway at the 
point some 24 feet south of its intersection with 
r_.acy Street, and had paused at the double white line in the 
center of the highway, waiting for traffic to "give me a 
chance" to the crossing. She testified that she 
suddenly became frightened by an oncoming truck and, with-
out looking further at turned around in a clockwise 
direction and to return to the westerly curb from 
which she had started. At a 8 or 9 feet from such 
1Unless otherwise stated the designation "plaintiff" refers to the 
injured wife. 
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automobile traveling south on 
Pernando and driven defendant Smith in the course 
of his defendant Weston Biscuit Company, 
Plaintiff did not remember taking any steps after her 
turn in the center of San and the next she knew 
was when she was in bed in the hospital. 
Defendant Smith testified that he saw plaintiff when 
80 feet away from the point at which she 
to return to the curb; that he was then traveling 
35 miles and uo cars were ahead of him; 
out into the center of the street and appeared 
to take two or three the center, then she whirled to 
her and ran back towards the west curb . . . in ap-
a line." Defendant was startled and 
"slammed on my brakes." He continued "to hold the brakes 
on" until his car and stated he was going approxi-
3 miles an hour when he struck plaintiff. Defendant's 
tires "laid dmvn" 72 feet of "skid-marks" in the street, 
from which an witness computed that the minimum 
"when it first started to lay down 
skid-marks" miles an hour. 
'l'he drivers of tvvo cars which were traveling immediately 
behind defendant and in the same (right hand or "curb") 
lane of traffic both testified that all three cars were traveling 
30 to 35 miles an hour, and both drivers saw 
turn to her right in the center of San 
.B'ernando and start to rnn back in a straight line to the curb. 
One of the drivers testified that "There was a lot of heavy 
traffic . . . there on San Fernando Road that morning.'' 
Other evidence established that morning traffic on San Fer-
nando is " ' the period from 8 to 10 o'clock. 
Plaintiff's first contention on appeal is that the trial 
court erred in evidence of the "average speed" 
the area of the accident, in the face 
a officer working in the area that San 
Fernando with 25-mile-an-hour speed limit 
at 1% miles north and 11;4 
miles south of Street intersection. On cross-
examination counsel for defendant the officer was per-
mitted to also over objection by plaintiff, that he 
would ''estimate'' that ''the average speed usually traveled 
at that time motorists" was "about 30 miles an hour 
along there.'' Other evidence in the record discloses that 
for some five years immediately preceding the accident 
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plaintiff had been intermittently employed in a laundry 
at the San Fernando and Lacy intersection, and that de-
fendant drove ''up and down San Fernando'' on an aver-
age of several times a week and thus was also familiar 
with the area in which the accident occurred. Plaintiff's 
arguments appear to be predicated upon the assumption that 
the evidence as to average speed of traffic in the area was 
offered by defendant solely to excuse his own conduct in 
driving at a rate admittedly in excess of the posted limits. 
However, as in Fowler v. Key System Transit Lines (1951), 
37 Cal.2d 65, 68 [230 P.2d 339], defendant pleaded that plain-
tiff was herself guilty of negligence proximately contributing 
to her injuries. Under such circumstances and in view of the 
undisputed fact that plaintiff attempted to return to the curb 
without looking for traffic which might be approaching, it 
appears that here, as in the Fowler case, the evidence of 
custom bore on the issue of contributory negligence and was 
''admissible as a part of the res gestae for the purpose of 
giving to the jury full knowledge of all the facts and cir-
cumstances which existed at the time and place of the acci-
dent, which were known to the parties, so as to permit the jury 
to pass upon the question of whether plaintiff conducted him-
self as an ordinary and reasonable person would have con-
ducted himself in the light of all of the circumstances.'' 
(frinir v. Cheney Bms. (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d 55, 63 [148 
P.2d138], quoted at page 69 of Fowler v. Key System Transit 
Lines, supra.) 
[2] Plaintiff next urges error in the trial court's refusal 
to permit her to prove that during her employment by the 
laundry she as well as other laundry employes had cus-
tomarily crossed San Fernando at the point here in question, 
that formerly a crosswalk had been marked there with white 
lines, and that a marked crosswalk had been authorized and 
directed at the point by "competent city authority." How-
ever, other testimony showed that between 125 and150 pedes-
trians crossed San Fernando Road daily at the point between 
7 a. m. and 6 p. m., that some six months prior to the accident 
San Fernando Road had been resurfaced, and that at the 
time of the accident two rows of metal buttons extended 
out from the west curb some 7 to 12 feet into the roadway 
which was 56 feet wide. Moreover, following objection by 
defendant's counsel to a question put by plaintiff's attorney 
as to how far the buttons extended out into San Fernando 
before it was resurfaced, and the attorney's statement that 
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the witness would answer that the ''metal markers extended 
completely across the street," the court ruled that "I will 
permit you to ask him if the buttons had previously gone 
across the street, or had at the time it was re-surfaced ... '' 
Although the record does not indicate that plaintiff's counsel 
thereafter took advantage of the court's ruling, it is apparent 
that plaintiff is not in a position to complain, since oppor-
tunity was thus provided her to prove that a marked cross-
walk formerly existed. Plaintiff cites no authority and none 
has been discovered supporting her claim that although a 
crosswalk actually was not marked at the time of the accident 
and had not been during the previous six months, she should 
have been permitted to prove that a marked crosswalk had 
been authorized and directed by ''competent city authority.'' 
On the record we perceive no error in the ruling. [3] Unless 
an authorized marked crosswalk is actually marked the mere 
fact that it has been authorized cannot affect the duties of 
persons using· the street. 
[ 4] Finally, plaintiff contends that error prejudicial to 
her case resulted from the court's refusal to give the follow-
ing two instructions requested by plaintiff by number (Nos. 
201-E and 102-A; see paragraph (a) of Rule 16, Rules for 
Superior Courts, 33 Cal.2d 7) from "California Jury In-
structions, Civil": 
No. 201-E: "While it is the duty of both the driver of a 
motor vehicle and a pedestrian, using a public roadway, to 
exercise ordinary care, that duty does not require necessarily 
the same amo1mt2 of caution from each. The driver of a 
motor vehicle, when ordinarily careful, will be alertly con-
scious of the fact that he is in charge of a machine capable 
2 0riginally instruction No. 201-E used the word "degree" instead of 
11 amount.'' 'l'he inaccuracy of saying that a different ''degree of care'' 
may be exacted of the driver of an automobile as compared with a 
pedestrian is forcefully pointed out in Lasater v. Oakland Scavenger Co. 
(1945), 71 Cal.App.2d 217, 221 [162 P.2d 486]. As stated by the court 
there, "'rhe decedent was struck by a truck while crossing a street in 
the darkness. Appellants proposed an instruction that by reason of the 
fact that she was dressed entirely in black she should have used 'a greater 
dPgree of care' for her own safety. The instruction wns erroneous in 
using the word 1 degree' insterrd of 'qmwtum' or 'amount.' The degree 
of cm·e required of a person for his own safety is always the same, 
i.e .• ordinary care, although in some circumstances the quantum OT amount 
of care required to reach the degree of ordinary care is greater than in 
others.'' 
In 19;"i0 instruc"tion No. 201-E was amended hy substituting tho word 
''amount'' for the word ''degree.'' Inasmuch as this tYial took place 
in 1952, plaintiff must be considered to have requested the instruction 
as it reads subsequent to the 1950 amendment. 
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of projecting into serious consequences any of his 
own. Thus his caution must be to that responsi-
bility as related to all the circumstances. A 
pedestrian, on the other his own physical 
body to manage and with which to set in motion a cause of 
injury. While, usually, that fact limits his to cause 
injury, as compared with a vehicle 
ordinary care, he, too, will be 
chanical power acting, or that may roadway, 
and of the possible, serious consequences from any conflict 
between himself and such forces. And the caution required 
of him is measured the of to 
him in the conditions at hand, or to 
a person of ordinary prudence in the same 
No. 102-A.: "Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by 
the ordinary prudent person varies in direct to 
the danger kno·wn to be involved in his it follows 
that in the exercise of care the amount of caution 
required will vary in accordance with the nature of the act 
and the surrounding circumstances. To the matter in 
another way, the amount of caution the law in-
creases as does the danger that should be appre-
hended.'' 
At defendants' request, the court did instruct as follows: 
"It is the duty of every person highway, 
whether a pedestrian or the driver of any kind of vehicle, 
to exercise ordinary care at all times him-
self or others in danger and to avoid 
''The law imposes upon tl-Je any vehicle using 
a public highway, and upon a the same duty, 
each to exercise ordinary care to an accident 
from which injury result. 'rhis continues even 
when one has the right of way over the other ... " 
Concerning the duties of to cross 
a street, the court, at defendants' included the fol-
lowing instructions: ""\Vhat observations he should make, 
and what he should do for his own while crossing the 
in detail and for all occasions, 
place upon him the rHn>+i,nnim 
to avoid an accident ... ·while 
such as that involved in thi;;.: CDRe, 
as 
e>ne>rr>n• to regulate 
.,.,,,,...,,,"-r : it does 
to cross the road at any point, thc;;e factors 
a right 
of consideration 
enter into the question of what conduct is ''"'"",...'"'"' of him 
Jan. CucrNELLA v. WEsTON BrscUIT Co. 77 
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in the J:I'irst: if he crosses at a 
marked crosswalk or within an un-
marked crosswalk at an the law requires him to 
the to all vehicles on the roadway so near 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. Second : the amount 
to constitute ordinary care increases as 
that a prudent person, in like 
in the situation. For example, 
fast traffic, poor visibility, obstructions 
these or any other perceivable factor in-
increases the amount of caution which an 
person would use.'' 
to the duties of the operator of a 
motor vehicle the court instructed, among other things, that 
''Section 671 of the Vehicle Code in effect at the time of 
the accident as follows: 'The driver of a motor 
vehicle when 
shall give audible 
necessary to insure safe operation 
with his horn. Such horn shall 
not otherwise be used.' 
"It will be noted that the law does not prescribe the 
eircumstances under which a horn shall be used, but 
that shall be given when reasonably neces-
saTy to insure . This means that the question whether 
or not the horn should have been sounded in this case is a 
question of fact for you to decide in the light of all the sur-
rounding the defendant's conduct 
\vhat have been expected of a reasonably prudent 
person under similar circumstances. 
"The at which a vehicle travels upon a highway, 
considered as an isolated fact and simply in terms of 'so many 
miles an hour, is not proof either of negligence or of the exer-
cise of ordinary care. 
"Whether that is a negligent one is a question of 
fact, the answer to which on all the surrounding 
circumstances. 
''The basic 
510 of the Vehicle 
law of this state, as provided in Section 
is as follows: 
" 'No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a 
greater than is reasonable or prudent, having due 
regard for the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the 
and in no event at a speed which endangers the 
safety of persons or property.' 
"A violation of this basic rule is negligence. 
"You are instructed that the Vehicle Code of the State 
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of California, in full force and effect at the time of the acci-
dent, provided as follows: 
'' 'Section 511. The speed of any vehicle upon a highway 
not in excess of the limits specified in this section or established 
as authorized in this code is lawful unless clearly proved 
to be in violation of the basic rule declared in Section 510 
hereof. 
'' ''fhe prima facie limits referred to above are as follows 
and the same shall be applicable unless changed as authorized 
in this code, if so changed, then only when signs have been 
erected giving notice thereof, in which event the speed desig-
mtted on the sign shall be the prima facie limit: Twenty-five 
miles per hour. 
'' ' ( 1) In a business or residence district.' . . 
''Conduct which is in violation of any of the statutes just 
read to you constitutes negligence per se. This means that 
if the evidence supports a finding, and you do find, that a 
person did so conduct himself, it requires a presumption that 
he or she was negligent. However, such presumption is not 
conclusive. It may be overcome by other evidence showing 
that under all the circumstances surrounding the event, the 
conduct in question was excusable, justifiable and such as 
might reasonably have been expected from a person of ordi-
nary prudence.'' 
A further instruction requested by defendants and given 
1vas that ''the fact of having the right of way, if such be the 
fact, [does not] excuse one from the exercise of ordinary 
care to avoid causing an accident." At plaintiffs' request, 
an instruction on imminent peril was also given.3 
The jury, midway in its deliberations, returned to the court-
room with a request that the instruction on imminent peril 
be reread, and the court thereupon again read ''a group of 
instructions which" the jury were again told "should be con-
3 The imminent peril instruction reads as follows: 
''A person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and 
unexpectedly confronted with peril, arising from either the actual pres-
ence, or the appearance, of imminent danger to himself or to others, 
is not expected, nor required, to use the same judgment and prudence 
that is required of him, in the cxereisc of ordinary care, in calmer and 
more deliberate moments. His duty is to exercise only the care that 
an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the same situation. If 
nt that moment he does whnt appears to him to be the best thing to do, 
and if his choice and manner of action are the same as might have been 
followed by any ordinarily prudent person under the same conditions, 
he does all tho law requires of him, although, in the light of after-events, 
it should appear that a different course would have been better and 
safer." 
Jan. 1954] CucrNELLA v. WESTON BiscuiT Co. 
[42 C.2d 71; 265 P.2d 513] 
79 
sidered together," including among others the imminent peril 
instruction and the instruction that "It is the duty of every 
person using a public highway, whether a pedestrian or the 
driver of any kind of vehicle, to exercise ordinary care at 
all times to avoid placing himself or others in danger and to 
avoid a collision'' and that the duty of exercising ordinary 
care "continues even when one has the right of way over the 
other." 
Another instruction given (but not re-read to the jury) 
was that even though a pedestrian is crossing outside a cross-
walk and thus is obliged to yield the right of way to vehicles 
on the roadway the vehicle driver is not thereby relieved 
''from t~e duty to exercise due care for the safety of any 
pedestrian upon a roadway.'' 
"Ordinary care" was defined to the jury as "that care 
which persons of ordinary prudence exercise in the manage-
ment of their own affairs in order to avoid injury to them-
selves or to others.'' 
It should be mentioned also that the court cautioned the 
jury that "If in these instructions, any rule, direction or 
idea be stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is in-
tended by me, and none mnst be inferred by you. For that 
reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence, or any 
individual point or instruction, and ignore the others, but 
you are to consider all the instructions and as a whole, and 
to regard each in the light of all the others.'' 
Plaintiffs, in support of their contention that instruction 
No. 201-E should have been given, rely upon Dawson v. 
Lalanne (1937), 22 Cal.App.2d 314 [70 P.2d1002], in which 
a judgment in favor of defendant was reversed on the sole 
ground of error in failing to instruct the jury that "the 
plaintiff and the defendant were both chargeable only with 
the exercise of ordinary care, but a greater amount of such 
care was required of the defendant at the time of the acci-
dent in question by reason of the fact that he was driving 
and operating an automobile, which is an instrumentality 
capable of inflicting serious and often fatal injuries upon 
others using the highway." The court there declared that 
"This instruction clearly states the rule of law applicable 
to the facts of the case and has been approved in a number 
of cases," as follows: Weihe v. Rath.ien 1YI ercantile Go. (1917), 
34 Cal.App. 302 [167 P. 287]; Raymond v. Hill (1914), 168 
Cal. 473, 483 [143 P. 743]; Vedder v. Bireley (1928), 92 
Cal.App. 52 [267 P. 724]; Pinello v. Taylor (1933), 128 
80 CumNELLA v. 'NEsToN BrscurT Co. 
Cal.App. 508, 514 [17 P.2c1 
St(pra, numerous other cases have 
couched in substantially the same 
Crescent A1do Co. ) , 20 
749]; B1·o1m v. Blair ), 
P.2d 95]; iV!artin v. Vien·a 
[93 P.2d 261]; McNem· v. 
[42 C.2d 
63 Cal.App.2d 11, 18-19 v. Curr·an 
(1953), 116 Cal.App.2d ; Geisler 
v. R1fgh (1937), 19 P.2d ; cf. 
De Greek v. li1reeman 645, 646 [291 
P. 854]; Mor·gan v. Los (1930), 105 
Cal.App. 224, 231 [287 P. ) , and others have approved 
the B.A.J.I. instruction No. 201-E which was here offered by 
plaintiff (see Sclutlman v. Los Corp. (1941), 
44 Cal.App.2d122, 128 [111 P.2d v. Stroh (1942), 
54 Cal.App.2d183, 189 P.2cl ; O'Br1~en v. Schellberg 
(1943), 59 Cal.App.2d 770 P.2d ). 
It is apparent that the intent of the instructions approved 
in the cited cases was to inform the that the elements 
of action constituting conduct which ordinary 
care are those commensurable with the involved 
and depend upon the character of the 
used or the nature of the act w·hieh is 
as related to the surrounding circumstances. If the particular 
instruction here requested 201-E) had con-
sisted of only the first sentence which contains the 
expression ''amount of caution,'' it would have been 
confusing to a jury. 'With the added however, 
set forth in the instruction, of the of the quoted ex-
pression as related to the duties of driver and of 
pedestrian the instruction as a whole states the law 
and explains that what is meant by amounts of 
caution is that the elements of conduct entering into ordinary 
care or caution will vary and must be related to the particular 
circumstances involved, including the character of the act 
being performed. Both in the instruction in Dawson 
v. Lalanne ( 1937), snpm, 22 and in the 
B.A.J.I. instruction here the meaning 
intended to be conveyed is the same. Another effort to ex-
press such meaning is found in Reed v. Stroh , sup1·a, 
54 Cal.App.2d 183, 189, stated as follows: " instruc-
tions] require that both motorist and exercise 
ordinary care; that the driver must be conscious of operating 
Jan.1954] CuCINELLA v. WESTON BrscurT Co. 
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an engine capable of immense and potential danger, and that 
the pedestrian must be conscious of the fact that he is in the 
midst of such dangers on the highway and guard against the 
possibility of injury apparent to a careful, prudent person." 
'l'ested by the standards above stated, and the circum-
stances of this case, instruction No. 201-E correctly states the 
law and, as its subject matter was not specifically covered 
by other instructions, it· should have been given. Before de-
termining whether the failure to give such instruction was 
prejudicial it is proper to recall that the trial court also 
refused, as above mentioned, to give plaintiffs' requested 
instruction No. 102-A, which states that the amount of caution 
required of the ordinary prudent person increases as does 
the danger that reasonably should be apprehended. Although 
refusing to give No. 102-A, the court at defendants' request 
instructed that ''·while . . . a pedestrian has a right to cross 
the road at any point ... the law requires him to yield the 
right of way to all vehicles on the roadway so near as to 
constitute an immediate hazard ... [and] the amount of 
caution required to constitute ordinary care increases as does 
the danger that a reasonably prudent person, in like position, 
would apprehend in the situation.'' 
In view of the seeming emphasis thus placed by some of 
the instructions on the duties of the pedestrian, it is our view 
that the court might well have given plaintiffs' requested 
No. 102-A (which in its terms would apply to drivers as well 
as pedestrians) as well as No. 201-E. Such emphasis, how-
ever, is at most a relative matter and is something the appear-
ance of which cannot always be avoided; it comes not from 
any misstatement of the law but from necessarily singling out 
the pedestrian in order to state accurately and fully the law 
applicable to any pedestrian under circumstances and in 
situations described in the evidence. Other instructions which 
in a like sense "emphasize" the duties of the operator of a 
motor vehicle were given. Such instructions are designed 
not to give unfair prominence to the obligations of the oper-
ator of a motor vehicle but to fully and fairly state the law 
applicable to any vehicle operator in the circumstances and 
situations described in the evidence. The fault in this case 
is not one of af:firmative misstatement of any rule of law but 
of failure to explain more fully that in the application of the 
general rules of law which were correctly declared, the jury, 
as a matter of law, as well as factually in using common sense, 
good judgment and general knowledge, should recognize that 
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the force of inertia of a heavy, fast moving vehicle is greater 
than that of a comparatively light and slow moving pedestrian 
and that the respectively ensuing potentialities of harm and 
devolving responsibilities vary accordingly. 
The close point in this case, if there is one, appears to us 
to depend on the interpretation of plaintiff's own conduct 
as established by her testimony. If such conduct can be 
reconciled with the standards of ordinary care imposed on a 
pedestrian crossing a roadway at a place other than an inter-
section or marked crosswalk it would seem to be on the theory 
of sudden confrontation with imminent peril. As pointed 
out above, the instruction on imminent peril was twice read to 
the jury. So also, the jury were instructed fairly as to the 
meaning of ordinary care and were cautioned that if ''any 
rule, direction or idea" had been stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon was intended, ''none must be inferred by 
you,'' and ''you are to consider all the instructions and as 
a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others.'' 
The rule is that "No judgment shall be set aside ... on 
the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper 
admission or rejection of evidence ... unless, after an exam-
ination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court 
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has re-
sulted in a miscarriage of justice.' '4 (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 4¥2; see, also, Loper v. JJiorrison (1944), 23 Cal.2d 600, 609 
[145 P.2d 1]; People v. De La Roi (1944), 23 Cal.2d. 692, 703 
[146 P.2d 225, 151 P.2d 837]; Speck v. Sarver (1942), 20 
Cal.2d 585, 589 [128 P.2d 16]; People v. Honeyctdt (1946), 
29 Cal.2d 52, 62 [172 P.2d 698]; People v. Sanchez (1947), 
30 Cal.2d 560, 575 [184 P.2d 673] ; Delzell v. Day (1950), 
36 Cal.2d 349, 351-352 [223 P.2d 625] ; Popejoy v. Hannon 
( 1951), 37 Cal.2d 159, 169 [231 P .2d 484].) The burden is 
on the appellant in every case to show that the claimed error 
is prejudicial; i.e., that it has resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice. (Vattghn v. Jonas (1948), 31 Cal.2d 586, 601 [191 
P.2d 432] .) Consideration of the entire cause, including the 
evidence as presented by the record, falls short of leading 
us to the opinion that failure to give the two numbered in-
''For illustrations or definitions of what may constitute a miscarriage 
of justice, see People v. Hall (1926), 199 Cal. 451, 458 [249 P. 859]; 
People v. Putnam (1942), 20 Cal.2d 885, 892 [129 P.2d 367]; People v. 
Rogers (1943), 22 Cal.2d 787, 807 [141 P.2d 722]; People v. Dail (1943), 
22 Cal.2d 642, 6!)0 [140 P.2d 828]; Daniels v. City g. County of San 
Ihancisco (1953), 40 Cal.2d 614, 624 [255 P.2d 785]; Delzell v. Day, 
(1950), 36 Cal.2d 349, 351-352 [223 P.2d 625]. 
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structions has resulted in a miscarriage of justice; hence, 
any error in refusing to give them does not appear to be prej-
udicial and does not justify reversal of the judgment. 
For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I am of the opinion that it was prejudicial error to admit 
evidence of the ''average speed'' traveled by vehicles in the 
area of the accident in view of the testimony showing that the 
area in question was posted with 25-mile-an-hour speed limit 
signs. It has been held numerous times by this court and 
by appellate courts of this state that the question of negligence, 
or lack of negligence, is not to be determined by what others 
did or did not do at the time and place under the particular 
facts and circumstances then and there confronting them, 
including the important and undisputed factor here that there 
·was a pedestrian in the street. In Rttdd v. Byrnes, 156 Cal. 
636, 642 [105 P. 957, 20 Ann.Cas. 124, 26 L.RA.N.S. 134], 
it was held that ''The standard of care required of persons 
under given circumstances is not to be established by proof 
that others have been in the habit of acting in a certain 
manner." In Phoenix Assu1·. Co. v. Texas Holding Co., 81 
Cal.App. 61, 74-75 [252 P. 1082], it was held "That a mere 
custom or usage cannot make due care out of conduct that 
is in fact negligence under the circumstances disclosed by the 
evidence has been stated a number of times by the courts 
of this state, as well as of other states .... the specific practice 
of others cannot be admitted in testimony as an excuse for 
the alleged negligent act of the defendant." And in Robinet 
v. Hawks, 200 Cal. 265, 274 [252 P. 1045], it was held that 
'' ... the doctrine of customary usage does not, to our knowl-
edge, apply to the question of legal duty under the law of 
negligence. In Perry v. Angelus Hospital Assn., 172 Cal. 
311, 315 [156 Pac. 449], we say: 'We know of no authority 
for the proposition that by continuing in a careless perform-
ance of duty a party transforms its negligence into due care. 
( Silviera v. Iverson, 125 Cal. 266 [57 Pac. 996].) ' '' In 
Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal.2d 410, 414 [126 P.2d 345], it was 
held: ''Assuming that other manufacturers likewise made no 
special examination to discover fractures such a custom would 
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these A somewhat similar 
the case of v. Wa1·man 
174 Cal. 556,561 [163 Pac. 885]. In Robinet 
v. Cal. Pac. 1045], this court said 
that the doctrine of usage does not apply to the 
question of legal duty under the law of negligence, or that 
the continuance of a c1neless performance of a duty would 
transforrn a into due care.'' In People 
v. 5, 16 P. 531], it was held that 
" 'The standard of care required of persons under given 
circumstances is not to be established by proof that others 
have been in the habit of acting in a certain manner.' " See, 
also, v. 130 Cal.App. 475, 482-484 [19 P.2d 
1004] ; Car·roll v. Ccntr·al C01mt1:es Gas Co., 96 Cal.App. 161, 
165-166 [273 P. 875]. 
Fowler v. Tmnsit Lines, 37 Cal.2d 65, 68 [230 
P.2d 339], relied upon by a majority of this court to support 
the determination that evidence of custom was properly ad-
mitted in the case at bar, involved an entirely different situa-
tion. There, the court, citing Adamson v. San Francisco, 
66 Cal.App. 256 [225 P. , said: "Where . . . a usual 
practice or custom has obtained, and ... the claim is rnade 
that one of the pa1·ties has, to the discomfit~tre of the other, 
witho~tt notice, departed fr·orn the 1tsual c1tstmn or practice, 
[emphasis added] the courts have by an unbroken line of 
decisions held that the qnest·ion of negligence on the part of 
the defendant, and the question of contribtdory negligence on 
the of the pla?:nt?>jf, are both questions for the jury to 
determine in the light of all of the facts, inclttding the evidence 
tend1:ng to establish the allegecl deviation therefrom." In 
the Fowler case, it had been alleged that the passenger had 
been injured while stepping from a bus which had not stopped 
at its customary stopping place. In Ross v. San Francisco-
Oakland T. R. Co., 47 Cal.App. 753, 766 [191 P. 703], relied 
on in the Fowler case, the court said: ''The settled practice 
of stopping a street-car at a particular place becomes a rule 
of conduct upon which the public has a right to rely to a 
reasonable extent, and a departure from such rule is a vitally 
important element in determining the question of negligence, 
for it constitutes a departure ·from the standard of safety 
which the defendant itself has adopted." The majority here 
rely upon M1ti1· v. Cheney Bros., 64 Cal.App.2d 55 [148 P.2d 
138], as it was cited in the Fowler case. The Muir case also 
involved a deviation from the normal method of travel on a 
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certain portion of highway which was "difficult of descrip-
tion.'' The evidence was offered to show the method in which 
most vehicles negotiated a turn on an intersection in the 
shape of an arc. It was offered to show the jury the full 
set of circumstances surrounding the accident in question. 
In support of the rule stated in the Muir case, and restated 
by the majority here, several cases are cited but none 
of them is in point. For example, in llatzakorzian v. Rucker-
Fuller Desk Co., 197 Cal. 82 [239 P. 709, 41 .A.L.R. 1027], a 
pedestrian was struck by an automobile driven by an employee 
of the defendant. The defendant alleged that the deceased 
met his death through his own contributory negligence. No 
custom was involved. 'restimony regarding statements made 
by the deceased prior to his death 'Nere held admissible so as 
to disclose ''that the deceased had in his mind and fully 
realized, as he was walking along or over the hig·hway just 
before he was struck, the perils or dangers of walking over 
the highway in the darlmess of night, and further tended to 
show that, while thus engaged, he was exercising due care 
for his own safety.'' .Another case is that of Dewees v. 
][u.ntz, 130 Cal..App. 620 [20 P.2d 733], where no evidence 
of custom was involved. The court there, in explaining the 
general rules governing the care to be used by the driver of 
an automobile summarized, in part, by saying: "In some 
cases the evidence may justify a conclusion that he had actual 
knowledge of the danger of collision; in others it may be 
concluded from the attendant circumstances that the defendant 
>vas advised of the peril, but in a less degree. If it appears 
that the defendant omitted to take a precautionary measure 
which was prescribed by law or usage, the imputation is that 
he must have had knowledge of the danger." In Mace v. 
Watanabe, 31 Cal.App.2d 321 [87 P.2d 893], the trial court, 
over objection, permitted a traffic officer to testify that it was 
the general custom and habit of motorists to travel the road-
way along each leg of the "Y" rather than to use the soft 
gravel forming the "V" of an intersection. This was offered 
to show that each leg of the "Y" constituted a well-traveled 
roadway and that the "V" did not constitute such a road-
way. It was there said that there was no error in the ad-
mission of such testimony since '''I' his evidence was not like 
that offered in llurtel v. Albert Cohn, 5 Cal.(2d) 145 
152 Pac.(2d) 922], to show the habit of pedestrians to violate 
traffic signals maintained for their protection .... 'fhe evi-
dence showed that the county had constructed and maintained 
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these two separate approaches, and the further evidence that 
they were commonly used as such by all motor traffic was 
material to respondents' case." In Scott v. Gallot, 59 Cal. 
App.2d 421, 426 [138 P.2d 685], it was held that evidence 
of custom which was a safety measure was admissible because 
it was not evidence of a custom which was negligent. 
Here the evidence of custom showed negligence-that of 
exceeding the posted speed limit in the area and that evidence 
could only have been considered by the jury to excuse any 
negligence on the part of the defendant. 
The law is well settled that mere custom or usage cannot 
make due care out of conduct that is in fact negligence under 
circumstances disclosed by the evidence (Phoenix Assur. Co. 
v. Texas Holding Co., supra, 81 Cal.App. 61; Rudd v. Byrnes, 
supra, 156 Cal. 636; Anstead v. Pacific Gas &: Elec. Co., 203 
Cal. 634 [265 P. 487]; Perry v. Angelus Hospital Assn., 172 
Cal. 311 [156 P. 449]; Robinet v. Hawks, sttpra, 200 Cal. 
265; Carroll v. Central Counties Gas Co., supra, 96 Cal.App. 
161; Mehollin v. Ysuchiyama, 11 Cal.2d 53 [77 P.2d 855] ; 
Shewarcl v. Virttw, supra, 20 Cal.2c1 410] ; People v. Crossan, 
supra, 87 Cal.App. 5; Wolfsen v. Wheeler, supm, 130 Cal. 
App. 475; Sanford v. Moreau, 249 App.Div. 915 [292 N.Y. 
Supp. 595]; 61 C.J.S. 271). 
Plaintiffs' offer of proof that plaintiff wife knew of a 
custom of crossing San Fernando Road at the point of the 
accident was refused by the trial court. The offer of proof 
consisted of this: ''If this witness were allowed to answer, 
she will testify that she had been crossing in this same cross-
walk area since she first became employed there in 1945, and 
when she first came to work there were white lines painted 
across the pavement of San Fernando Road; that there have 
always been these metal-- There have always been metal 
strips across the road; that she, even in company with many 
other employees and patrons of the Riverview Laundry had 
crossed there; that she had seen many, many persons cross 
in that particular area right up to the time of the accident, 
and she herself as I say, has crossed there to take the street-
car, as she was doing this morning." While the offer of proof 
was somewhat inartistically phrased, the meaning is clear. 
Plaintiffs sought to prove that the particular crossing space 
had formerly been a marked crosswalk and that since the 
San Fernando Road had been resurfaced and the white lines 
obliterated, it had by reason of custom become an unmarked 
crosswalk. We find in the record that one of defendants' 
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instructions told the jury in a negative manner that if a 
pedestrian crosses at a point other than within a marked 
crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, 
the law requires him to yield the right of way. Stated af-
firmatively, the :taw requires a motorist to yield the right of 
way to a pedestrian crossing within a marked or unmarked 
crosswalk. Section 560 (a) of the Vehicle Code provides : ''The 
driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian 
crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within 
any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except as other-
wise provided in this chapter." Had the evidence been ad-
mitted, the jury would have been properly instructed since 
the instruction as given was substantially in the language of 
the section. Without the evidence, the instruction was mean-
ingless and pointless. The evidence would have shown that by 
custom the point in question was an unmarked crosswalk 
giving plaintiff wife the right of way. Such evidence was 
not only admissible but material to plaintiffs' case. Its ex-
clusion was clearly prejudicial. 
I am also of the opinion that the failure to give plaintiffs' 
instruction 201-E constituted prejudicial error. It is admitted 
in the majority opinion that the requested instruction correctly 
states the law; that its subject matter was not covered by 
other instructions and that it should have been given. In 
the majority opinion, it is then pointed out that the trial 
court also failed to give plaintiffs' instruction No. 102-A. 
No. 201-E would have told the jury that "While it is the 
duty of both the driver of a motor vehicle and a pedestrian, 
using a public roadway, to exercise ordinary care, that duty 
does not require necessarily the same amount of caution from 
each. The driver of a motor vehicle, when ordinarily care-
ful, will be alertly conscious of the fact that he is in charge 
of a machine capable of projecting into serious consequences 
any negligence of his own. Thus his caution must be adequate 
to that responsibility as related to all the surrounding cir-
cumstances. A pedestrian, on the other hand, has only his 
own physical body to manage and with which to set in motion 
a cause of injury. While, usually, that fact limits his capac-
ity to cause injury, as compared with a vehicle driver, still, 
in exercising ordinary care, he, too, will be alertly conscious 
of the mechanical power acting, or that may act, on the public 
roadway, and of the possible serious consequences from any 
conflict between himself and such forces. And the caution 
required of him is measured by the possibilities of injury 
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to him in the conditions at or that would be 
to a person of in the same posi-
tion." Plaintiffs' instruction No. 102-A would have told the 
that ''Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by the 
ordinary prudent person varies in direct proportion to the 
danger known to be involved in his undertaking, it follows 
that in the exercise of ordinary care the amount of caution 
will vary in accordance with the nature of the act 
and the surrounding circumstances. 'ro put the matter in 
another way, the amount of caution required by law increases 
as does the that should be apprehended.'' 
Numerous cases are cited in the majority opinion to the effect 
that instruction No. 201-E is a correct statement of the law. 
For some reason, best known only to a majority of 
this court, defendant's instruction that ''-While . . . a pe-
destrian has a right to cross the road at any point ... the 
law requires him to yield the right of way to all vehicles 
on the roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard 
... [and] the amount of caution required to constitute ordi-
nary care increases as does the danger that a reasonably 
prudent person, in like position, would apprehend in the 
situation" is quoted. It is then admitted that there has been 
a ''seeming'' emphasis placed on the duties of a pedestrian 
and that "it is our view" that the court might well have 
given plaintiffs' requested No. 102-A "as well as No. 201-E." 
But despite these admissions of error and "seeming" favorit-
ism to the defense, it is concluded that no prejudice was 
suffered by plaintiffs. Or, at least, not enough error to con-
stitute a miscarriage of justice because a different verdict 
"would have been improbable." I say that a different ver-
dict would have been 1nost probable had these errors not 
occurred. 
In failing to give plaintiffs' two requested instructions and 
in giving those requested by defendant, the trial court 
·weighted the scales in favor of the defendant by placing a 
greater burden of care on a pedestrian than that which the 
law imposes and relieved the motorist of the responsibility 
which has been imposed on him. Vve are told in the majority 
opinion, that ''Although, as mentioned, some of the instruc-
tions hereinabove quoted appear to emphasize the duties of a 
pedestrian who essays to cross a thoroughfare at a point other 
than an intersection or marked crosswalk, such emphasis is at 
most a relative matter and is something the appearance of 
which cannot always be avoided. The emphasis comes not 
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from any rnisstaiernent of the law b1tt necessarily singling 
out the in order to state accurately and f~tlly the 
law applicable to any ttnder circumstances and in 
situations described in the evidence." (Emphasis added.) 
There was no of out the Had 
plaintiffs' requested instructions a fair trial would 
have been more likely. Had the instructions been given (and 
it must be remembered that they correctly stated 
the law and shou.ld have been the other errors com-
plained of would not have been so pernicious. Under 
the facts of this case, it may be seen that, first, in 
admitting evidence of a so-called custom of evading the law 
and exceeding the limit which practice plaintiff 
wife was supposedly in effect, told 
that plaintiff wife was at that par-
ticular point where all were fast. In the 
refusal to give her confusion was compounded 
by placing a of care on as a pedestrian, 
than on the one a mechanical contrivance capable of 
inflicting great bodily mJury. These two errors, added to 
the refusal to admit plaintiffs' evidence of a custom of all 
pedestrians to cross at an unmarked crosswalk (which had 
been previously a marked crosswalk and which was to be, 
again, a marked could have had but one result: 
that of impressing upon the that plaintiff wife had a 
tremendous duty of care for her own person in crossing a 
highway upon which cars were known to exceed the speed 
limit and that in failing to take all these things into con-
sideration she was of contributory negligence which 
proximately caused her injuries. \Ve are told that instruc-
tions which "seemed" to emphasize the duties of the operator 
of a motor vehicle were "not to unfair prominence 
to the obligations of the of a motor vehicle but to 
fully and fairly state the law applicable to any vehicle oper-
ator in the circumstances and situations described in the evi-
dence. The fault in this case is not one of affirmative mis-
statement of any rule of law but of failure to explain more 
fully that in the of the general rules of law which 
were correctly declared, the as a matter of law, as well 
as factually in using commwn sense, good ju.dgment and gen-
eral knowledge, should that the force of inertia of 
a heavy, fast moving vehicle is greater than that of a com-
paratively light and slow moving pedestria.n and that the 
respectively ensuing potentialities of harm and devolving re-
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sponsibilities vary accordingly." (Emphasis added.) Error 
is admitted; the instructions should have been given; so 
prejudice resulted. It is elemental that the jury determines 
the facts and renders its verdict ttnder the proper principles 
of law. How is a body, composed of laymen untrained in the 
law, to make a correct determination and come to the right 
conclusion when it has not been ftllly and faiJ·ly instructed as 
to the proper principles of law 'I The majority of this court, 
whose signatures appear there, would be the first to cry with 
horror that a jury must not be allowed, unaided by instruc-
tions on the applicable law, to decide which one of two op-
posing parties was guilty of either negligence or contributory 
negligence. In fact, normally, juries are considered so un-
reliable in their factual determinations that a majority of 
this court would substitute itself for those august bodies and 
take even the most minute factual determination upon itself. 
Yet here, a jury is permitted to make a determination (and 
a majority of this court affirms that determination) unaided 
by the proper instructions. The result achieved in this case 
brings home the truth of the saying that "there ott.ght to be 
a closed season on us pedestrians'' ! 
The discussion in the majority opinion as to the nonprej-
udicial character of the errors committed by the trial court 
in this case is meaningless. Some errors are conceded. The 
prejudicial character of any error is purely a matter of 
opinion. While the majority does not hold that it was error 
to admit evidence of custom as to the speed of automobiles 
at the place where the accident occurred or exclude the testi-
mony offered by plaintiff relative to the custom of pedestrians 
to cross the street at that point it is conceded that the jury was 
erroneously instructed relative to the respective duties and 
responsibilities of pedestrians and operators of motor vehicles. 
From my examination of the record in this case I do not be-
lieve it can fairly and honestly be said that if the errors in 
question had not been committed a different result would have 
been improbable. On the other hand, I think it highly im-
probable that the same result would be obtained upon a new 
trial free from the errors here shown. For this reason I 
believe the errors were prejudicial, and I would therefore 
reverse the judgment and direct that a new trial be had. 
